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Financial Constraints and Employee Satisfaction 
 
Chenxing Jinga, Kevin Keaseyb,*, Ivan Limc, Bin Xud 





Using over 120,000 employee reviews collected by Glassdoor between 2008 and 2015, we 
investigate whether firm financial constraints reduce employee satisfaction. We find that employee 
satisfaction is substantially lower in financially constrained firms. Decomposing employee ratings, 
we find that firm financial constraints are associated with employees’ concerns regarding work-
life balance, senior leadership, and career progression. Our study implies that employee 
satisfaction could be an important channel through which financial constraints reduce firm value.  
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Employees constitute a key element of the human capital assets of a firm and their satisfaction is 
a primary driver of firm value (Edmans, 2011; Green et al., 2019). Satisfied employees are more 
motivated, productive and loyal, which in turn, improves firm performance (Edmans, 2012). It is 
thus essential for firms to ensure the wellbeing of employees and the satisfaction of their work 
lives.  
 Maintaining employee satisfaction could, however, depend on a firm’s access to finance. 
Financially constrained firms with limited access to external financing could see a reduction in 
investment in employee-friendly human resource policies and a deteriorating workplace culture, 
leading to worse employee satisfaction (Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016). For instance, employees may 
be forced to work overtime and lose on-the-job perks, face increasing pressure from their superiors 
resulting in lower morale and confidence, and have uncertain career progression. We thus 
hypothesize that financial constraints have a negative impact on employee satisfaction.  
 Using various proxies and empirical strategies to capture firm financial constraints, we find 
that financial constraints are associated with lower employee satisfaction. Further analysis reveals 
that lower satisfaction is driven by decreasing employee assessments of Work-life Balance, lower 
confidence in Senior Leadership and worse Career Opportunity. Consequently, less satisfied 
employees are less likely to Recommend the firm in the labor market, leading to challenges in the 
recruitment of talent.  
 This is the first study that examines the effect of firm financial constraints on employee 
satisfaction at the individual level. Our contributions are twofold. First, we contribute to the 
emerging literature on the real effects of financial constraints. Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) 
document that financial constraints increase workplace injuries, while our study shows that 
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financial constraints can have a much broader impact on employee wellbeing. Second, our study 
is related to the increasing literature on corporate culture (e.g. Guiso et al., 2015). We show that 
certain dimensions of corporate culture, such as work-life balance, are sensitive to changes in 
financial constraints.  
 An important implication of this study is that under-investment in intangible assets (e.g., 
employee satisfaction) can be a channel through which financial constraints reduce firm value, 
particularly in the long run. Our results caution against reducing investments in intangible assets 
when financing is tight. Moreover, given the importance of employee satisfaction for firm 
performance, our results imply that firms should be prudent in their financing choice. Maintaining 
financial slack (i.e. spare debt capacity and cash reserve) could play an important role in sustaining 
employee satisfaction.  
 
2. Data and Empirical Model 
Glassdoor is an employee review website where employees can anonymously assess their 
company on various aspects such as overall satisfaction, work-life balance, senior leadership, 
career opportunities, and recommend.1  We merge employee level Glassdoor reviews, which 
include employee characteristics, to U.S. public firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
for the period 2008-2015. Firm financial data is from Compustat. Following Hales et al. (2018) we 
exclude reviews from former employees and firms with less than 50 reviews over the sample 
period. Our final sample comprises 848 firms with 120,610 employee reviews. 
 Our baseline model of the relation between financial constraints (FC) and employee 
satisfaction is as follows: 
 
1 The definitions of Glassdoor variables are presented in the Appendix.  
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𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ Φ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                 (1) 
 
where i denotes individual review, j denotes the firm, and t denotes the fiscal year respectively. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the Overall Rating expressed in individual reviews. 𝐹𝐶𝑗𝑡  is 
measured using the WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006) and text-based measures of financing 
constraints in the equity and debt markets (Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2014). We also examine the 
moderating effect of exogenous state-level corporate tax increases (that increases a firm’s demand 
for debt) on constrained firms (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). 2  X are firm and employee 
characteristics. Firm and year fixed effects are included. This eliminates any systematic firm or 
year unobservable factors that could bias our results such as corporate culture.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A reports summary statistics of employee reviews. The mean of Overall Rating is 
3.440, while other sub-category ratings vary. T-tests of means reveal that constrained firms have 
substantially lower overall and sub-category ratings than unconstrained firms.3 The rows (columns) 
in Panel B report the average number of reviews per firm for various percentiles of the distribution 
in a year (across the years). As observed, there exists substantial variation both within, and across, 




2 Refer to the Supplementary Appendix (SA) for a discussion of the various common measures, and additional results 
for financial constraints. 
3 Unconstrained and constrained firms are defined as the top and bottom terciles of the WW index.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A # of Reviews Mean SD Unconstrained Constrained Difference 
Overall Rating 120,610 3.440 1.162 3.586 3.294 0.292*** 
Work-life Balance 113,465 3.413 1.236 3.632 3.176 0.456*** 
Senior Leadership 112,832 3.038 1.275 3.153 2.931 0.222*** 
Career Opportunity 113,660 3.254 1.207 3.358 3.157 0.201*** 
Recommend 101,857 1.680 0.467 1.740 1.618 0.122*** 
 
Panel B: avg. # reviews per firm for the n
th 
percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
2008 1 4 7 12.5 40 
2009 9 13 22 40 106 
2010 8 13 19 44 147 
2011 2 5 8 14 49 
2012 8 14 25.5 48 182 
2013 11 21 31 61 237 
2014 14 25 37 72 316 
2015 9 16 26 47.5 228 
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of equation (1). The dependent variable is Overall Rating. 
Columns (1)-(2) examine the relation between overall rating and financial constraints measured 
by the WW index with different combinations of firm and employee level controls. Columns (3)-
(4) employ text-based measures that separately capture financial constraints in the equity and debt 
market. Finally, in Column (5), we interact state-level corporate tax increases with the WW index. 
A negative sign on the interaction term FC*Tax Shock suggests that constrained firms become 
more constrained in periods when raising debt is optimal (following tax increases when the 
marginal benefit of using debt increases). Throughout all the analysis, we show that the financial 
constraints of a firm have adverse effects on employee satisfaction levels. 4,5 Specifically, a one-
 
4 We also employ the ordered probit estimator, and obtain consistent results. 




standard-deviation increase of financial constraints measured by the WW index, decreases 
employee satisfaction by 3.3% relative to the mean.  
 
Table 2: Financial Constraints and Employee Overall Rating 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Rating 
 





WW Index  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.350*** -1.330*** -0.732** -0.596*** -1.431***  
(-3.43) (-3.50) (-2.26) (-2.68) (-2.85) 
FC*Tax Shock  
    
-0.288*** 
     
(-2.88) 
Tax Shock  
    
-0.002 




0.057*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.023 
  
(4.44) (3.53) (3.53) (1.35) 
Employee Age 
 
-0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  
(-11.01) (-7.92) (-7.87) (-9.12) 
ROA 0.069 0.056 -0.017 -0.033 -0.329 
 
(0.34) (0.29) (-0.06) (-0.13) (-0.98) 
Size 0.032 0.035 0.122 0.146* 0.102 
 
(0.51) (0.56) (1.47) (1.80) (1.07) 
Leverage 0.003 -0.000 -0.089 -0.070 0.144 
 
(0.03) (-0.00) (-0.65) (-0.48) (0.94) 
Market-to-Book -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.89) (-0.45) (-0.43) 
      
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,610 120,610 77,129 77,129 67,956 
R-sq 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.030 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FC is the abbreviation of Financial 
Constraints. 
 
In Table 3 we analyze the relationships between sub-category ratings and financial constraints 
(measured by the WW index). Employees in constrained firms report a deteriorating Work-life 
Balance, worse assessments of Senior Leadership and a less optimistic view of Career 
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Opportunity. Consequently, these employees are less likely to Recommend their firm in the labor 
market, impeding the recruitment of talent.6   
 












(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC -0.903*** -1.073*** -1.357*** -0.315*  
(-2.80) (-2.73) (-3.60) (-1.73) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 113,465 112,832 113,660 101,857 
R-sq 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.020 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FC is the abbreviation of Financial 
Constraints measured by WW index.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Using over 120,000 employee reviews from Glassdoor for the period 2008-2015, we find 
employees in financially constrained firms report lower satisfaction levels. Lower satisfaction 
levels are driven by decreasing assessments of work-life balance, senior leadership and career 
progression. Our findings caution against “squeezing” employees when financial resources are 
tight given the importance of intangible assets (i.e., employee satisfaction) for firm value.  
 
6 To alleviate concerns of over/under-sampling due to the distribution of employee reviews, we also use weighted 
least squares (by the # of reviews per firm), exclude the top/bottom 5 and 10 firms with the most/least reviews in the 
SA and find similar results. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Employee Satisfaction Ratings 
Overall Rating Employee’s overall rating of employer ranked on a five-point scale, 
with 5 being very satisfied. 
Work-life Balance Employee’s assessment of work-life balance ranked on a five-point 
scale, with 5 being very satisfied. 
Senior Leadership Employee’s assessment of employer’s senior leadership ranked on a 
five-point scale, with 5 being very satisfied. 
Career Opportunity Employee’s assessment of the opportunities for career advancement 
ranked on a five-point scale, with 5 being very satisfied. 
Recommend Recommend this employer to a friend? (No=1, Yes=2) 
  
Financial Constraints  
WW index –0.091 [(ib + dp)/at] – 0.062[indicator set to one if dvc + dvp is 
positive] + 0.021[dltt/at] – 0.044[log(at)] + 0.102[average industry 
sales growth] – 0.035[sales growth] (see Whited and Wu (2006)) 
Equity Constraints Text-based measure of equity financing constraints (Hoberg and 
Maksimovic, 2014). 
Debt Constraints Text-based measure of debt financing constraints (Hoberg and 
Maksimovic, 2014). 
Tax Shock Tax shock dummy equals one if a state experiences a corporate tax 




Leverage Total debt divided by assets 
Size Natural logarithm of sales   
ROA Net Income divided by sales 
Market-to-Book Market value of equity divided by book value of equity  
Employee Educ. Equals one if the highest degree of employee is over bachelor 
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1. Weighted Least Squares Regression 
To alleviate concerns of over/under-sampling due to the distribution of employee reviews, we 
replicate our main results (Tables 2-3) using a Weighted Least Squares regression: weighting 
the regression by the number of reviews per firm scaled by total reviews. The results are 
consistent with the findings displayed in the paper.  
 
 
Table SA.1: Financial Constraints and Employee Overall Rating 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Rating  





WW Index  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -0.997*** -1.428*** -0.206** -1.060*** -0.817***  
(-7.02) (-10.00) (-1.99) (-9.31) (-4.43) 
FC*Tax Shock  
    
-0.322***      
(-3.00) 
Tax Shock  
    




0.096*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.039**   
(7.03) (3.42) (2.83) (2.30) 
Employee Age 
 
-0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012***   
(-22.55) (-19.96) (-20.22) (-18.28) 
ROA 0.424*** 0.255*** 0.560*** 0.462*** 0.252***  
(5.44) (3.30) (5.49) (4.59) (2.60) 
Size -0.072*** -0.083*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.054***  
(-9.25) (-10.56) (-2.74) (-2.90) (-5.36) 
Leverage -0.908*** -0.891*** -0.452*** -0.404*** -0.740***  
(-28.05) (-27.66) (-11.72) (-10.49) (-16.90) 
Market-to-Book 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003** 0.007***  
(6.98) (7.83) (-3.10) (-2.14) (4.78) 
      
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No No 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,610 120,610 77,129 77,129 67,956 
R-sq 0.037 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.058 








Work-life Balance Senior Leadership Career Opportunity Recommend  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC -5.627*** -0.753*** -1.105*** -0.454***  
(-35.03) (-4.56) (-7.14) (-6.88) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 113,465 112,832 113,660 101,857 
R-sq 0.035 0.028 0.033 0.047 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FC is the abbreviation of 
Financial Constraints measured by WW index.  
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2. Robustness Check: Excluding firms with extremely large and small numbers of 
reviews 
We exclude the top/bottom ten firms with the largest/smallest numbers of reviews. The results 
are qualitatively similar. The results are also similar if we exclude the top/bottom five firms. 
 
 











WW Index  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FC -1.410*** -1.394*** -0.921** -0.481* -1.426**  
(-3.02) (-3.09) (-2.39) (-1.74) (-2.56) 
FC*Tax Shock  
    
-0.298***      
(-2.97) 
Tax Shock  
    




0.050*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.020   
(3.43) (2.80) (2.76) (1.04) 
Employee Age 
 
-0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***   
(-8.82) (-6.21) (-6.15) (-7.45) 
ROA -0.102 -0.115 -0.282 -0.280 -0.422  
(-0.39) (-0.46) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-1.06) 
Size 0.054 0.059 0.153 0.178* 0.123  
(0.69) (0.77) (1.40) (1.66) (1.13) 
Leverage -0.016 -0.022 -0.171 -0.139 0.078  
(-0.13) (-0.17) (-1.05) (-0.79) (0.46) 
Market-to-Book 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002  
(0.09) (0.06) (-0.60) (-0.07) (-0.64) 
      
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 95,496 95,496 59,379 59,379 55,713 
R-sq 0.015 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.031 








Work-life Balance Senior Leadership Career Opportunity Recommend  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC -1.213*** -1.179** -1.451*** -0.391*  
(-3.14) (-2.54) (-3.21) (-1.76) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 89,817 89,325 89,975 80,321 
R-sq 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.018 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. FC is the abbreviation of 
Financial Constraints measured by WW index.  
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3. Other Financial Constraint Measures and Employee Ratings 
In our paper we use the WW index as the main “accounting based” measure of financial constraints 
because it has several important advantages. First, the WW index is constructed using a structural 
model and thus avoids sample selection, simultaneity and measurement-error issues that are 
common in linear based models such as the KZ (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) index (Whited and 
Wu, 2006). Second, the WW index appears to have the benefit of more accurately identifying firm 
characteristics that are correlated with financial constraints as compared to the KZ index. 
Specifically, Whited and Wu (2006) show that firms that are classified as constrained by the WW 
index are firms we would expect to have difficult access to external finance: firms that hold more 
cash (to facilitate investment) and firms that belong to high sales growth industries but have low 
firm sales growth (face more competitive pressure on their cash inflow). In contrast, the KZ index 
classifies firms as constrained when they are larger (when we would in fact expect them to be 
smaller because size should be positively related to the ease of raising external capital), have low 
cash holdings (when we should expect firms that have difficulty in raising funds to hold more 
precautionary cash) and firms that have high sales growth operating in industries with low sales 
growth. Third, due to its construction, the WW index has “sufficient” time-series variation 
(compared with the HP (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) index) that we can exploit even when we 
include firm fixed effects.  
We use the KZ index and the HP index as alternative measures of financial constraints in Tables 
SA.5 and SA.6, respectively. The coefficients on these two measures are insignificant, except in 
Column (2) in Table SA.5 where the KZ index has a significantly negative impact on Work-life 
Balance at the 5% level. The weak results based on the KZ index can be attributed to its limitations 
as discussed in the recent literature. The literature (Whited and Wu, 2006; Hadlock and Piece, 
2010; Farre-Mensa and Ljunqvist, 2015) suggests that while the KZ measure is a useful starting 
point in pioneering the literature on financial constraints, it does seem to face some difficulties in 
accurately portraying constrained firms. For example, Whited and Wu (2006) show that the KZ 
index fails to accurately identify firm characteristics that are expected to be correlated with 
financial constraints. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Farre-Mensa and Ljunqvist (2015) also point 
out that the KZ index is an “outlier” (in terms of correlation) to common measures of financial 
constraints (such as the WW index). The insignificant results based on the HP index is not 
surprising due to the fact that the index relies on firm age and size, both of which are relatively 
time-invariant and would, therefore, be absorbed by firm fixed effects.  
 
 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
KZ index -0.0004 -0.0024** 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0007  
(-0.41) (-2.08) (0.02) (-0.80) (1.60) 
Employee Educ. 0.0490*** 0.0738*** 0.0966*** 0.0206 0.0256***  
(3.77) (3.93) (6.40) (1.24) (4.30) 
Employee Age -0.0109*** -0.0133*** -0.0130*** -0.0117*** -0.0046***  
(-10.53) (-12.92) (-12.23) (-12.33) (-9.32) 
ROA 0.1561 -0.1583 0.4299** 0.1864 0.1238  
(0.78) (-1.12) (2.44) (0.99) (1.40) 




(1.38) (2.58) (1.33) (2.38) (0.84) 
Leverage -0.0114 -0.1493 -0.0558 0.0134 0.0350  
(-0.09) (-1.08) (-0.41) (0.10) (0.64) 
Market-to-Book -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0006  
(-0.98) (-0.94) (-0.18) (-0.39) (-0.79) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 111,143 104,537 103,946 104,724 93,744 
R-sq 0.023 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.019 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. KZ index is defined as  
–1.001909[ (ib + dp)/lagged ppent] + 0.2826389[ (at + prcc_f×csho - ceq - txdb)/at] + 3.139193[(dltt + 
dlc)/(dltt + dlc + seq)] – 39.3678[(dvc +dvp)/lagged ppent] – 1.314759[che/lagged ppent]. 
 
 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HP index -0.0607 -0.3216 -0.3194 -0.1745 0.0723  
(-0.19) (-1.32) (-1.10) (-0.61) (0.48) 
Employee Educ. 0.0569*** 0.0762*** 0.1000*** 0.0263 0.0287***  
(4.43) (4.22) (6.88) (1.63) (4.99) 
Employee Age -0.0108*** -0.0131*** -0.0130*** -0.0116*** -0.0046***  
(-11.07) (-13.38) (-12.93) (-12.72) (-9.85) 
ROA 0.1712 -0.0984 0.4191*** 0.1690 0.1116  
(0.91) (-0.75) (2.58) (0.98) (1.30) 
Size 0.0804 0.0619 0.0382 0.1237** 0.0370  
(1.39) (1.12) (0.62) (2.11) (1.52) 
Leverage 0.0006 -0.1141 -0.0987 0.0009 0.0278  
(0.01) (-0.93) (-0.79) (0.01) (0.57) 
Market-to-Book -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0005  
(-0.45) (-0.39) (0.18) (0.05) (-0.69) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 120,610 113,465 112,832 113,660 101,857 
R-sq 0.022 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.019 
Note: Firm-clustered SEs in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. HP index is defined as (–0.737Size 
+ 0.043Size2 – 0.040Age), where Size is the log of inflation-adjusted Compustat item at, and Age is the 





4. The Individual Components of the WW Index 
We decompose the WW index into individual components and test which components are relevant 
in determining employee satisfaction in Table SA.7.7 As observed in Column (1), where we 
include all our controls as per the paper, we find that the economic and statistical significance on 
the individual WW components are quite different from the specification in Column (2), where we 
 
7 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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do not include firm controls. This is not surprising as some of the individual components are highly 
correlated with the firm controls we include. For instance, WW1 (cash flow) is highly correlated 
with ROA, while WW4 (total assets) is highly correlated with our Size variable. Therefore, in this 
analysis on the individual components of WW, we prefer to rely on the specification in Column 
(2) that does not include firm controls.  
As observed in Columns (2), (4) and (7), we find that WW2 (dividend dummy) and WW5 (industry 
sales growth) appear to be the components of the WW index that are driving our results. The 
cessation of dividend payments appears to be significantly related to a decrease in employee ratings 
(Columns 2 and 4). This is unsurprising as cutting dividends can be seen as a negative signal to 
the future prospects of the firm and managers would be reluctant to do so if the firm is not 
financially constrained (e.g., Leary and Michaely, 2011). Therefore, the cutting of dividends 
appears to be a particularly significant predictor of the financial constraints that influence 
employees’ satisfaction levels. Indeed, dividend payment has been used as a proxy for financial 
constraints in the prior literature (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2015).  
For WW5 (industry sales growth), we find that higher industry growth is related to lower employee 
satisfaction. One reason for this is that firms could be pushing their employees harder to remain 
competitive in a fast-growing industry, leading to lower satisfaction levels. This result is also 
interesting because in both the KZ and HP measures there are no components that directly 
incorporate the effect of industry growth on financial constraints. Subsequently, this could also be 
one key reason why employee satisfaction levels are driven by the WW index but not by the KZ 
and HP indices. 
 
 
Table SA.7: Individual Components of the WW Index and Employee Overall Rating 
  
Overall Rating  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
WW1 27.892*** -1.088 -1.351 
     
 
(3.04) (-0.52) (-0.66) 
     
WW2 -1.362** -1.308** 
 
-1.305** 





    
WW3 -19.077* -4.576 
  
-3.751 





   
WW4 1.997* -0.951 





   
(-1.00) 
  
WW5 -2.025*** -1.920** 





    
(-2.23) 
 
WW6 -1.745 -2.471 
     
-1.689  
(-1.11) (-1.59) 
     
(-1.04) 
Employee Educ. 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057***  
(4.43) (4.40) (4.39) (4.43) (4.39) (4.41) (4.39) (4.38) 
Employee Age -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***  
(-11.04) (-11.09) (-11.05) (-11.07) (-11.08) (-11.08) (-11.14) (-11.06) 
ROA 2.620*** 
       
 
(3.03) 
       
Size 0.180** 
       
 
(2.36) 
       
Leverage 0.398* 
       
 
(1.72) 
       
Market-to-Book -0.001 
       
 
(-0.60) 
       
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Note: WW1 is cash flow to asset (–0.091*[(ib + dp)/at]), WW2 is an indicator that equals to one if the firm 
pays cash dividends (– 0.062[indicator set to one if dvc + dvp is positive, and zero otherwise]), WW3 is 
long term debt to asset (0.021*[dltt/at]), WW4 is firm size (– 0.044*[log(at)]), WW5 is industry sales 
growth (0.102*[average industry sales growth, estimated separately for each SIC3 industry and each year]), 
and WW6 is firm sales growth (– 0.035*[sales growth]).  
 
